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The Paris Agreement of December 2015 set a highly ambitious target for global climate change 
mitigation, but it remains unclear how it will be reached and the individual countries’ pledges do 
not add up to the overall target. Can transnational climate governance initiatives be expected to fill 
the gap? We assess 109 such initiatives based on four design criteria: existence of mitigation 
targets, incentives for mitigation, definition of a baseline, and existence of a monitoring, reporting 
and verification procedure. About half of the initiatives do not meet any of these criteria and not 
even 15% satisfy three or more. Many initiatives were created only for the purpose of networking. 
Orchestration by national governments and international organizations increases the number of 
criteria met. On average, the mitigation focus of new initiatives was highest during the “heyday” of 
the international climate policy regime between 2005 and 2010. While mitigation-oriented 
entrepreneurial initiatives are generally started only in response to existing regulation, sub-national 
governments and NGOs show some attempts to go beyond that and compensate for insufficient 
regulation at the national and international level. Yet, given the low overall quality assessment, 
transnational climate governance initiatives cannot be expected to fill the “mitigation gap”.  
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The Paris Agreement adopted by all member countries of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in December 2015 sets a highly ambitious global target 
for a limitation of global warming to “well below” 2°C from preindustrial levels (UNFCCC 2015a), 
specifying that greenhouse gas emissions and sinks shall reach a balance in the second half of the 
21st century. Thus massive reductions of greenhouse gas emissions are required in the next 
decades. However, the Agreement builds on government mitigation pledges (Nationally 
Determined Contributions, NDCs) that, for developing countries, largely depend on the availability 
of external funding. The existing pledges are estimated to imply a temperature increase of at least 
2.7°C by 2100 (Climate Action Tracker 2015; UNEP 2015a; UNFCCC 2015b). While the Agreement 
foresees a “ratcheting up” of NDCs every five years, it remains to be seen whether this process can 
close the emissions gap.  
The UNFCCC can be seen as being part of a larger regime complex for climate change 
(Keohane and Victor 2011). Hence achieving mitigation depends not only on the UNFCCC. High 
hopes have been put in transnational climate governance (TCG) initiatives including subnational 
entities, private sector associations and individual firms, as well as NGOs. In 2014 UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon called a special summit inviting world leaders from finance, business, and civil 
society along with governments “to galvanize and catalyze climate action” (United Nations 2014). 
Similarly, in the run-up to the decisive 2015 UNFCCC conference in Paris, French President François 
Hollande underscored the important role of TCG initiatives (Hollande 2015:85).  
A rich strand of academic literature exemplified by Bulkeley et al. (2014) examines the rise 
of these initiatives in recent years. However, it is unclear so far whether TCG initiatives are effective 
in reducing emissions (Stavins, Zou, Brewer, Conte Grand, den Elzen, Finus, Gupta, Höhne, Lee, 
Michaelowa, Paterson, Ramakrishna, Wen, Wiener, Winkler, Bodansky, Chan, Engels, Jaffe, Jakob, 
Jayaraman, Leiva, Lessmann, Newell, Olmstead, Pizer, Stowe, Vinluan 2014). Pinkse and Kolk (2009) 
stress the complexity of measuring outcomes. A number of papers suggest that effectiveness 
depends on complementarity with national and/or international regulation. Green (2013:2), for 
instance, describes the UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol as a “coral reef” that attracts a number of 
interesting complementary initiatives. Pfeifer and Sullivan (2008) see government regulation as 
crucial to send signals to investors that are then reflected in a TCG initiative. Companies want to 
achieve their commitments in an efficient way and thus engage in TCG initiatives once national 
level mitigation policy instruments have been established. Similar arguments about 
complementarities are made in the general literature on TCG initiatives (Potoski and Prakash 2005; 
Berliner and Prakash 2014) and by some of the papers in this issue. TCG initiatives may also 
influence government regulation, such as private carbon market standards that lead to an 
improvement in mandatory carbon market regulation (Hoffmann 2011). A substantial literature 
examines the general context in which such voluntary programs – in the area of climate change 
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mitigation and beyond – can be successful (Baccaro and Mele 2011; Baranzini and Thalmann 2004; 
Berliner and Prakash 2015; Cashore, Auld, Bernstein and McDermott 2007; Darnall and Kim 2012; 
DeLeon and Rivera 2009; Morgenstern and Pizer 2007; Overdevest 2010; Overdevest and Zeitlin 
2014).  
We directly examine which contribution TCG initiatives can be expected to make to climate 
change mitigation. Our first contribution is the development of a specific set of criteria that can be 
used for that purpose covering the whole range of TCG initiatives. As it is too early for an evaluation 
of their effectiveness, we focus on their design and the direct mitigation benefits that can be 
expected thereof. In line with Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001a:767, 2001b:1079) we believe 
that design is highly relevant for later effectiveness and that therefore, the study of the initiatives’ 
design already provides us with important elements for their evaluation. Our second contribution 
is the empirical examination of the conditions under which an initiative is more likely to fulfill the 
above criteria. In this context, we specifically consider the initiatives’ membership composition 
(entrepreneurial, NGOs, sub-national), and their complementarity to national and international 
regulation. Eventually, we can shed some light on the question whether the high expectations 
regarding the role of TCG initiatives for climate change mitigation can be fulfilled. Overall our results 
are rather sobering, but certain types of initiatives show promise in complementing existing 
regulation. 
In principle, TCG initiatives can contribute to the ambitious target of the Paris Agreement 
in two ways: First, they can react to national or related international regulation by, simply 
responding to these regulations promoting the concrete implementation of corresponding 
measures, and thereby helping governments to reach their NDCs (or, prior to the Paris Agreement, 
their Kyoto targets). We refer to these initiatives as “complementary initiatives”. Second, they can 
pro-actively address the lack of national government ambition, and thereby contribute to closing 
the current gap between the sum of NDCs and the mitigation needed to reach the Paris Agreement 
target. We refer to these initiatives as “stand-alone initiatives”. Despite their greater 
independence, stand-alone initiatives do not necessarily need to be more promising than 
complementary ones.  
We expect these two types of initiatives to be driven by different motivations. Existing 
regulation may provide strong incentives for the private sector to develop innovative strategies to 
efficiently handle the respective requirements. This may lead to business-driven, complementary 
TCG initiatives. Other actors like NGOs may focus more on filling the gaps  by pushing for reforms 
where existing regulation is lacking or appears to be insufficient. The underlying motivation should 
play a role for the design of these initiatives, and hence we will systematically distinguish between 
 
complementary and stand-alone initiatives when assessing whether and under which conditions 
they meet our key criteria for an effective mitigation-oriented institutional design. This provides 
important insights regarding the interaction of different institutions within the climate change 
regime complex, and regarding the implications of this interaction for mitigation. 
Our assessment of 109 initiatives started between 1990 and mid-2015 finds that less than 
15% satisfy at least three of the following four criteria of a mitigation-oriented design: a) existence 
of mitigation targets, b) incentives for mitigation, c) definition of a baseline and d) existence of a 
monitoring, reporting and verification procedure.  
Through multivariate econometric analysis we show that entrepreneurial initiatives require 
regulation in order to have a mitigation-oriented design, while initiatives developed by sub-national 
governments and NGOs are more likely to target mitigation beyond existing national-level policies. 
Overall, we conclude that the lack of mitigation ambition on the government level cannot be “made 
up” by mitigation achieved through transnational climate governance initiatives, as too few of the 
latter have a mitigation-oriented design.  
 
Measuring the Mitigation Orientation of TCG Initiatives 
Many studies on transnational climate governance simply look at the emergence of new 
initiatives. An analysis of their expected or actual mitigation effectiveness is rare. This may lead to 




Measuring an initiative’s mitigation contribution and thereby distinguishing effective from 
ineffective (or less effective) initiatives is a difficult task (Chan and Pauw 2014; Pinkse and Kolk 
2009). It is rarely possible to directly observe effects of transnational initiatives or voluntary 
programs more generally. Exceptions are possible only when examining a single program on the 
basis of very detailed information of the mitigation action of its individual members. A convincing 
example is the analysis of the Global Compact by Berliner and Prakash (2015). Assessing the impact 
of a program further requires the specification of a plausible counterfactual or baseline. For 
instance, while we might be able to measure that emission reduction projects under the “Gold 
Standard” are indeed more convincing than projects that do not fulfill this standard, how do we 
know that these convincing projects would not have been better than other projects even without 
the existence of the standard? This identification problem plagues the literature of the 
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effectiveness of international regimes more generally (see Helm and Sprinz 2000:633ff; Tetlock and 
Belkin 1996:3, Young 1999).  
We solve this problem by focusing our analysis on the assessment of the different 
initiatives’ institutional design. Thus, we can examine a broad range of initiatives and make them 
comparable with the view to a single objective, namely mitigation, the key goal of the Paris 
Agreement towards which TCG initiatives must contribute. From a results chain perspective, a 
mitigation-oriented design can be considered as an “output”, the initial step towards effectiveness 
at the outcome or impact level. Assessing outputs is much less ambitious than assessing outcomes 
or impact, and it may entail the risk to overestimate success (Young 2011). Indeed the evaluation 
literature based on results chain frameworks typically considers the relevant outputs as a 
necessary, but not a sufficient condition for outcomes and impact. Therefore, we look at the 
minimum requirements for possible effectiveness.  
Admittedly, this perspective ignores unexpected or unintentional effects. Scholars from a 
social-constructionist school of thought discuss several theoretical mechanisms that may lead to 
an impact beyond initial intentions. They suggest that private initiatives, even if not initially 
designed for public good benefits may eventually develop dynamics that could still yield such 
benefits in the long run driven by the interaction between different members within the initiative, 
or between members and other actors such as national governments and consumers (for example 
Baccaro and Mele 2011; Cashore, Auld, Bernstein and McDermott 2007; Christensen, Morsing and 
Thyssen 2013; Haack, Schoeneborn, and Wickert 2012; Overdevest 2010; Overdevest and Zeitlin 
2014). However, so far this literature tends to find only very limited empirical evidence for these 
processes to work in practice (Baccaro and Mele 2011; Cashore et al. 2007). Some exceptions seem 
to exist for specific areas and under specific conditions such as strengthening consumer demand 
that induces competition between firms (Overdevest 2010 and Overdevest and Zeitlin 2014 for 
forestry).  
We are thus rather skeptical about the significance of such positive dynamics in our context 
and doubt the potential of TCG initiatives without a mitigation-oriented design to develop in a way 
that generates significant mitigation. At least without considerable changes in external conditions 
(an exogenous rise in consumer demand or stronger regulation), whose effects would, however, 
not be confined to existing TCG initiatives, such developments seem to be rather unlikely. 
Therefore, we believe that a convincing mitigation-oriented design can indeed be considered as a 
minimum requirement for the later mitigation effectiveness of TCG initiatives. 
 
What constitutes such a design? A potential trade-off between stringency and participation 
is frequently discussed in the institutional design literature (for example Bernauer, Kalbhenn, Koubi 
and Spilker 2013). The basic idea is that both stringency and broad-based participation are 
important, but that emphasis on the former tends to reduce the latter. Hence, the most stringent 
initiatives are not necessarily the most effective ones. Clearly, the optimum can neither lie at very 
low stringency (if there are no requirements, there will be no effect), nor at very low participation 
(if there are no participants, there will equally be no effect), but must be somewhere in between. 
This implies that for sufficiently basic stringency criteria, enhancing stringency will lead to higher 
effectiveness.1 
The same argument can be made for the potential trade-off between stringency and the 
number of TCG initiatives. Having a large number of different initiatives may be beneficial for the 
effectiveness of the regime complex as a whole, and high stringency may limit the number of 
initiatives. Yet, again, the negative effect on the number of initiatives will only dominate the 
positive direct effect of stringency beyond a certain point.  
We will hence formulate basic design criteria, which we consider necessary for any 
plausible effect on mitigation. 
 
Basic Design Criteria for Effective Mitigation 
Our ability to build on existing approaches in this context is very limited. To the best of our 
knowledge, no comprehensive classification of TCG initiatives with respect to their mitigation 
potential has been provided so far. UNEP (2015b) has come closest to this objective and provides a 
clear and credible approach, but by limiting the assessment to the analysis of mitigation targets the 
final indicator can be calculated only for a small subset of 15 initiatives. Similarly, Hsu, Moffat, 
Weinfurter and Schwartz (2015) also focus on mitigation targets (announced either by the 
initiatives or by their members). While this focus on targets allows the authors to compute the 
potential volume of emission reductions, it ignores other pathways of climate change mitigation 
that are not directly quantified within the initiatives, for example through the use of financial 
incentives. Research initiatives to go beyond these initial classifications are under way, but not yet 
                                                            
1 Mathematically, this can be illustrated as follows. Let mitigation (M) be given by M=x(m)·m, where m is 
mitigation achieved per member, and x is the number of members. x is a negative function of m. For 
simplicity, let it be a linear function, , x=a-bm, with a and b being some positive parameters. Overall mitigation 
M can thus be rewritten as: M=(a-bm)·m or M= am-bm2. 
We obtain the optimum by maximizing M over m: 
M’(m)=a-2bm=0   => m*=a/2b. 
The optimal level of stringency is m*. As long as stringency is below m*, this is suboptimal even though lesser 
stringency increases membership. Only beyond m*, greater stringency reduces effectiveness because the 
negative effect on membership overrides the positive direct effect of stringency. 
7 
 
fully developed and applicable (Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate Actions 2015; GDI and LSE 
2015).  
It appears to us that including other criteria beyond the definition of a mitigation target is 
essential to do justice to the different types of initiatives. As stated above, financial incentives may 
also contribute to effective emission reductions, at times even more than the definition of targets. 
The Pilot Auction Facility, for example, invites project developers to participate in auctions and 
thereby selects and funds the most efficient mitigation projects. In addition, monitoring, reporting 
and verification (MRV) devices can raise transparency and thereby create competition for best 
practice, at least as far as this is valued by the population. An example is the International Council 
of Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI), a city network that supports inventories of its members’ 
emissions so that they become comparable within and across countries. This may have some effect 
even without the definition of targets. Finally, the definition of a baseline is important to distinguish 
any kind of mitigation activities from business as usual. 
We hence consider four criteria that should be met for any initiative to plausibly contribute 
to mitigation action: the definition of a mitigation target, the introduction of financial incentives, 
the specification of a baseline, and the definition and use of MRV. Note that these criteria are truly 
basic in that we do not further specify any requirements regarding the stringency of the target, the 
volume of the financial incentives, or any special methodological requirements regarding the 
calculation of the baseline or the stringency and robustness of the MRV system. We only consider 
whether there is any mitigation target, incentive, baseline, or MRV. 
We note a substantial complementarity between these criteria. In fact, a target without 
verification may not have any effect, no matter how ambitious the announcement. Similarly, 
financial incentives may not generate the expected effects if there is no monitoring – moral hazard 
would undermine mitigation. And the most serious monitoring may not guarantee any 
improvement beyond business as usual if the latter is not assessed. For any convincing initiative we 
would hence expect those criteria to be met simultaneously. A stand-alone initiative should ideally 
meet all four criteria; for complementary initiatives, either a mitigation target or a financial 
incentive may be sufficient to generate mitigation benefits. For instance, the target may be 
provided through national commitments made under the Kyoto Protocol, so that individual 
initiatives would not need to define such targets. However, even initiatives intended to 
complement rather than to substitute for domestic and international regulation are much more 
credible when several criteria are fulfilled.  
 
Figure 1 presents the distribution of initiatives according to the number of criteria met. It 
shows that only a single initiative meets all four criteria while almost half of the initiatives do not 
meet any of them. 25% of the initiatives meet only one of the four criteria, 15% two, and 13% three. 
Given the complementarities discussed above, we must conclude that no more than 14% of all 109 
TCG initiatives show a design convincingly directed at climate change mitigation, and only one may 
be considered convincing as a stand-alone initiative. Especially since there are no requirements 
regarding the level of ambition underlying the individual design criteria, the overall distribution 
provides little justification for the high hopes expressed regarding their potential to support 
governments in meeting their mitigation objectives, or to even go beyond that. The shares of 
initiatives fulfilling the individual criteria are: 46% for MRV, 27% for a baseline, 13% for incentives, 
and 11% for a mitigation target (see Online Appendix I, Table A1).  
Figure 1 about here 
 
Not surprisingly, this sobering result regarding the design characteristics of TCG initiatives 
directly reflects their purpose. Table 1 provides an overview that illustrates this point: While most 
initiatives are mitigation-related in principle, many focus on networking, and direct benefits for 
mitigation are not necessarily intended. Such initiatives may still be valuable for their respective 
purposes, but we expect a limited climate change mitigation benefit. 
Table 1 about here 
 
Theoretical Considerations 
The creation of a TCG initiative with a design encouraging effective mitigation reflects the 
disposition of its members to actively engage in combating climate change. However, why should 
a rational actor want to take any serious steps towards mitigation given that true mitigation is 
usually costly, and so is even the mere participation in transnational networks (see Dolšak and 
Prakash, this volume).  
In our theoretical discussion, we distinguish between three major groups of participants 
within TCG initiatives: The private sector (firms and business associations), sub-national 
governments, and NGOs. We will discuss the incentives of each of these groups and to what extent 
they depend on existing regulation at the national and international level. In addition, we consider 
the role that national governments or international organizations may have in reinforcing the 




The general literature on voluntary corporate environmental programs identifies several 
mechanisms that may create incentives for the private sector to participate in such initiatives. 
Berliner and Prakash (2014, 2015) suggest that demand for products from participating firms may 
be greater allowing price increases. More generally, firms can reap reputational benefits (Potoski 
and Prakash 2005, 2013; see also Green, this issue), directly increasing their market value. However, 
to ensure that reputation cannot accrue from simple window dressing, considerable transparency 
is required. In climate change mitigation, such transparency is not easy to achieve and may depend 
on national and international regulation. Furthermore, public awareness often depends on national 
and international government action since debates about existing or upcoming regulation, notably 
at UNFCCC meetings, frequently spur substantial media attention (see, for example, Michaelowa 
and Michaelowa 2012). 
Moreover, provided there is domestic regulation, membership in a TCG initiative may signal 
regulatory compliance to the national authorities (for example through ISO certification of their 
company-internal processes) who then redirect their verification efforts towards other firms. In this 
case, the firms can reduce transaction costs of the verification process. This obviously hinges on the 
seriousness of the national verification process, including the absence of corruption (Berliner and 
Prakash 2014).  
A similar mechanism is conceivable with respect to international regulation. For instance, 
to facilitate the acceptance of a project under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) that generates certified emission reductions that can be sold on the market, it may be helpful 
to adhere to the stricter rules of the private “Gold Standard” initiative in the first place. 
Finally, firms’ voluntary engagement may be based on the expectation to achieve domestic 
or international regulatory requirements in a more cost-efficient manner. This may be achieved by 
the promotion of research and development activities or by exploring first mover advantages, for 
example by investing in carbon funds early on to benefit of low hanging fruits, cheap and large 
mitigation interventions. In these cases, participation in voluntary initiatives may make sense as 
soon as the regulation is expected, even if it is not yet agreed upon.  
All the above suggests that the private sector should have a strong incentive to respond to 
existing or imminent domestic and/or international greenhouse gas emissions regulation by 
participating in effective mitigation-oriented TCG initiatives. However, can mitigation-oriented TCG 
initiatives also be attractive for the private sector independently of national or international 
regulation?  
 
In principle, they could if there were sufficiently high direct co-benefits, for example 
through information about new and efficient technologies that can reduce production costs in the 
medium to long term. We expect, however, that efficient technological adjustments are already 
partially accounted for in business as usual scenarios, and that the specific (additional) mitigation 
orientation of such stand-alone initiatives will thus be low, notably in comparison to initiatives 
created in response to existing regulation.  
 
H1: Stand-alone entrepreneurial TCG initiatives do not have a mitigation-oriented design. 
H2: Complementary entrepreneurial initiatives (entrepreneurial initiatives responding to 
existing or imminent national or international regulation) have a stronger mitigation-
oriented design than stand-alone initiatives. 
 
Sub-National Governments 
Regarding sub-national entities such as regions or cities, we assume that the profit 
maximizing perspective we adopted for firms can be replaced by a utility maximizing perspectives 
based on public support, or, more specifically, electoral support if countries are democracies. 
People in specific localities may have a direct interest in climate change mitigation that is not met 
by regulation at the international or domestic level. In fact, in many countries in which the 
populations are most vulnerable to climate change, domestic regulation has no potential to solve 
the problem, because of poverty and lack of industrialization there are hardly any local emissions 
that could be reduced. Transnational cooperation of sub-national entities such as cities and regional 
governments may then provide an alternative avenue to push the agenda. The effectiveness of 
transnational cooperation created on this basis will, of course, depend on the willingness of high 
greenhouse gas emitters to also participate in such initiatives and to increase their mitigation 
efforts. If high emitters are not willing to make such serious efforts and this can be anticipated by 
developing countries, it does not make much sense for the latter to promote such initiatives either. 
The key question therefore is whether people in highly emitting regions – possibly without 
much direct benefit from climate change mitigation – may support local or regional governments 
engaging in TCG initiatives. This could happen because they generally value the protection of the 
environment and/or care for people more directly concerned in other world regions or in later 
generations. Co-benefits of greenhouse gas mitigation such as reduction of health costs due to local 
air pollution can also provide a motivation, notably in emerging economies. This can lead to special 
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efforts by some sub-national governments to go beyond required regulation or to even try to 
compensate for national and international policies that are considered to be insufficient.  
At the same time, the literature also suggests positive relationships between national 
environmental policies, national regulation, and the engagement of sub-national entities 
(Andonova, Hale and Roger 2014). By highlighting the role of domestic NGOs on the engagement 
of cities, Dolšak and Prakash (this issue) also point at the link between national and sub-national 
policy support. Moreover, arguing that domestic mitigation policy instruments may untighten the 
sub-national units’ budget constraints, Cao and Ward (this volume) provide an alternative 
theoretical rationale for a complementary rather than stand-alone engagement of cities and 
regions. However, this only applies for specific national policies that provide a direct financial 
reward for mitigation action. 
In sum, as opposed to private firms, theoretical arguments can be made for both stand-
alone and complementary activities of sub-national entities. We consider that notwithstanding the 
above arguments, their engagement for mitigation-oriented design of TCG initiatives may be even 
greater for stand-alone initiatives because in many areas, regulation at higher levels will already 
fulfill the needs of the local constituencies. Except for the rationale based on special financial 
incentives provided by national governments, even in the case of complementary initiatives, the 
argument for local or regional governments’ interests to achieve mitigation eventually hinges on 
either altruistic preferences of the population that may be partially offset by vested interests of 
local industries, or on local co-benefits that tend to be relevant only up to a certain point in 
economic development. Beyond this point local pollutants will be reduced through the use of filters 
and other technical devices while greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise. Overall, this may lead 
to some positive, albeit not very strong incentives to participate in TCG initiatives with a convincing 
mitigation-oriented design.  
 
H3: TCG initiatives based on sub-national government membership have a mitigation-
oriented design        (albeit only weakly so). 
H4: Stand-alone TCG initiatives based on sub-national government membership have a 





NGOs are usually assumed to be intrinsically motivated for climate change mitigation driven 
by environmental and distributional norms. As people self-select into different groups of actors, it 
is indeed plausible that NGO members have particularly strong preferences in this respect. This 
should induce them to promote both, transnational activities complementary to existing regulatory 
policies, and stand-alone initiatives going beyond current regulation. In order to be most effective, 
they might even wish to engage primarily in stand-alone activities attempting to move things ahead 
where government has not (yet) taken any responsibility.  
However, NGOs work under budget constraints, just like any other actors considered here. 
Their budget is usually composed of private donations and public subsidies. This is why their 
activities also depend on the valuation by the general public and different levels of government. If 
a topic runs out of fashion, NGO resources in this area may dry up. This is why even for NGO-driven 
initiatives, the stand-alone potential must be considered as rather limited.  
It should also be noted that NGOs cannot themselves reduce emissions, but only induce 
others to do so. As a consequence there are no TCG initiatives only consisting of NGOs, and in the 
TCG initiatives where they are present, they tend to focus on consulting or knowledge sharing. 
While their inclusion might signal a willingness of all actors to strive for climate change mitigation, 
their actual influence on the design of the initiative may be limited.  
H5: TCG initiatives with NGO membership have a mitigation-oriented design (albeit only 
weakly so). 
H6: Stand-alone TCG initiatives with NGO membership have a stronger mitigation-oriented 
design than complementary initiatives. 
 
Orchestration by International Organizations and National Governments 
Finally, we consider international organizations and national governments that initiate and 
shape TCG initiatives. While ‘initiating’ refers to the influential role as a founding member, ‘shaping’ 
refers to an influence over the initiative after its creation, either directly or through funding. They 
are considered as the two dimensions of ‘orchestration‘, which is examined in detail by Hale and 
Roger (2014).  
In our view, orchestration should be positively related to a design for TCG initiatives that 
effectively addresses mitigation. While national governments can contribute funding and establish 
matching national policies (for example through the recognition of certain standards for offset 
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credits), international organizations can provide advice or help strengthening the coordination 
between members. Sometimes they also host the initiatives. Thus, the initiatives are regularly 
exposed to the ideas developed in the organization in which they are embedded. Since some 
international organizations such as the World Bank have already gained considerable experience in 
the field of carbon market mechanisms, they could use their influence to improve the mitigation 
orientation in the design of TCG initiatives. 
They might use their influence even more at times when their climate-related preferences 
are not matched by corresponding progress at the international level. As illustrated by the example 
of the Ban Ki-moon summit above, during the pre-Paris lack of progress at the UNFCCC level, there 
was a clear attempt to mobilize stand-alone bottom-up initiatives. This suggests a general tendency 
of increased initiating and shaping activities in recent years, possibly also with an effect on the 
mitigation-related design of these initiatives. As a consequence, the role of orchestration might be 
even greater for stand-alone initiatives than for complementary ones.  
H7: TCG initiatives orchestrated by international organizations and national governments 
have a mitigation-oriented design. 
H8: For stand-alone TCG initiatives’ orchestration has a stronger positive effect on 
mitigation-oriented design than for complementary initiatives. 
 
Empirical Analysis 
We test these hypotheses for a total of 109 initiatives. They include 65 initiatives from the 
Roger et al. (2015) dataset. From the original data, 10 observations have been dropped because 
they either constitute sub-initiatives of initiatives already taken into account, do not meet Hale and 
Roger’s (2014) inclusion criteria for TGC initiatives (according to the latest information available on 
the respective websites), or do not provide any information at all so that not even their mere 
existence can be ascertained. At the same time, we update the dataset by including 44 additional 
initiatives, mostly for the period from 2010 onwards when the coverage of the original dataset 
ends. To select these initiatives, we follow the original codebook used by Roger et al. (2015) based 
on the definitions developed in Andonova, Betsill and Bulkeley (2009) that were first applied in 




Let us first define our dependent variables. Based on our four basic criteria, several 
indicators could be used. Given their complementarity, we would ideally have constructed an 
indicator variable for those initiatives that meet all four criteria. However, as this is the case only 
for a single initiative, we provide alternative indicators based on lower requirements. ‘3 criteria 
met’ is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if three out of the four conditions are fulfilled, and 
‘2 criteria met’ is a similar measure for at least two criteria being met. For each of these, Figure 2 
shows the number of initiatives by foundation year as well as the total number of initiatives created. 
The latter shows a peak after the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005, and in 2014 due to 
the Ban Ki-moon summit. 
Figure 2 about here 
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In addition to these indicators, we use a variable for the total number of criteria met 
measured by adding up all criteria that are fulfilled (‘sum of criteria’). Finally, we consider all the 
individual criteria separately. This leads to seven dependent variables that are systematically 
introduced in all our regression tables.  
The operationalization of our explanatory variables relies partly on Roger et al. (2015) (for 
a discussion, see also Bulkeley et al. 2012). To distinguish the actor groups, we use their categories 
‘entrepreneurial’ (non-state actors played the leading role in initiating the initiatives) and 
‘transgovernmental’ (only sub-state actors were responsible for their creation). While the 
definition of entrepreneurial initiatives does not exclude NGOs, in practice, this category is 
dominated by the private sector (firms and business associations). To specifically analyze the role 
of NGOs, we code an additional indicator variable ‘NGO members’ for TCG initiatives including 
NGOs. NGOs usually do not create TCG initiatives (although there are some exceptions), but they 
may be members in initiatives created by others, and thereby able to exert some influence. Note 
that only the first two categories (entrepreneurial and transgovernmental) are mutually exclusive. 
At the same time, some initiatives do not fall in any of the categories, for example when they are 
initiated by international organizations and do not have NGO membership. 
For orchestration, we supplement the variables for initiating and shaping from the Roger 
et al (2015) database by the additional indicator ‘Depends on gov.’, which captures the initiation of 
the initiative by national governments (and in exceptional cases some other form of direct influence 
of government policy, without participation of the government in the initiative).  
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Our concept of stand-alone versus complementary initiatives is measured in relation to the 
existence of country targets (‘Country target’) representing national regulation,2 and the existence 
of a functional legally binding international regime (‘Kyoto operational’) representing international 
regulation. This period of effective international regulation (2005-2009) is contrasted with the 
period ‘Post Copenhagen’ (after 2009) where it became clear that the Kyoto Protocol had no long-
term future. A TCG initiative created in a country with a country target or during the period in which 
the Kyoto Protocol was operational is considered as complementary, otherwise as stand-alone. 
We systematically control for those initiatives whose main purpose is adaptation 
(‘Adaptation focus’), as well as for the membership structure (‘Structure’) of the initiative varying 
from 1 (centralized) to 3 (decentralized) thereby capturing the specificities of networking initiatives. 
In addition, we control for the initiatives’ starting year (‘Year’) and for cases, in which there is no 
single founding country because the initiative was set up by international organizations, the World 
Bank (‘WB’), the European Union (‘EU’) or other international organizations (‘INT’). In additional 
analyses presented in the online appendix, we further control for economic, political and emission-
related characteristics of the founding country.  
 
Results 
Tables 2-4 present the results from heteroscedasticity-consistent linear regression models 
(see Online Appendix II for a methodological discussion). In Table 2 the focus is on complementary 
versus stand-alone initiatives with respect to national regulation. In Table 3 the perspective shifts 
to international regulation. Finally, Table 4 provides some more insights in the role of orchestration. 
The Online Appendix  follows the same structure with a larger set of controls.  
Throughout all models (in all tables), national governments seem to play an important role. 
The variable ‘Depends on gov.’ is one of the most robustly significant variables across all 
regressions. It increases the ‘sum of criteria’ by more than one point and raises the probability to 
achieve a positive score on ‘2 criteria met’ and ‘3 criteria met’ as well as on most of the individual 
criteria by over 50%. A general exception is the mitigation target. This is plausible since a country 
can be expected to set its mitigation target through other means, so that this is not what 
governments would primarily encourage TCG initiatives to do. Among the other individual criteria, 
the effect is the smallest (and least significant) for MRV – probably because generally, most 
                                                            
2 Country targets have to meet some minimum stringency criteria as defined by Ecofys et al (2014) to be counted 
here. See the online Appendix . 
 
initiatives focus on this aspect. Overall, however, this result suggests a strong effect of national 
government initiation and thereby provides some initial support for hypothesis 7.  
Another variable that quite robustly shows a positive association with the mitigation focus 
of TCG initiatives is the existence of country targets in the founding country. Regarding the 
coefficient estimates for the individual criteria, the effect is at times only marginally significant or 
not significant at all, but the effect on the aggregated measures ‘sum of criteria’, ‘2 criteria met’ 
and ‘3 criteria met’ is always significant at least for one of these measures. This provides a first 
indication of relevant complementarities between effective TCG initiatives and national regulation. 
The complementarities that other authors in this volume find between the creation of new 
initiatives and government regulation hence also exist regarding the mitigation orientation of these 
initiatives.  
Note that in Table 2 (and Table A2) the coefficient estimates and significance of this 
variable have to be interpreted differently than in the other tables as the variable also enters in 
different interaction terms to explore complementarity with the engagement of individual actors. 
The coefficient of the variable itself only refers to those initiatives that are neither entrepreneurial, 
nor transgovernmental, nor have NGO members. 
Table 2 shows that in the absence of country targets, the overall association of 
entrepreneurial initiatives with a mitigation-oriented design tends to be negative. Regression (2) 
for instance, indicates that the probability that entrepreneurial initiatives meet at least two out of 
our four basic criteria is 10% lower than for other initiatives. The existence of a country target does 
not seem to matter much in this context as all interaction terms are insignificant. The overall 
negative assessment is consistent with other evaluations of voluntary agreements of companies 
that have been found mostly to represent business as usual (Baranzini and Thalmann 2004) or to 
focus on the least costly measures that still guarantee recognition by the market (Berliner and 
Prakash 2015). The findings are also in line with hypothesis 1 that expected no mitigation-oriented 
design for stand-alone entrepreneurial initiatives. Yet, hypothesis 2 suggested a more strongly 
mitigation-oriented design for complementary initiatives. At least on the basis of our proxy for 
national regulation, we find no evidence for this.  
However, in our estimations, the negative association is not homogeneous across all 
criteria. Entrepreneurial initiatives seem to do relatively well regarding the specification of 
mitigation targets, which is the least frequently met criterion otherwise. In addition there are 
individual entrepreneurial activities that score really highly, so that there is no significant effect 
with respect to the ‘3 criteria met’ indicator. 




As opposed to entrepreneurial initiatives, in the absence of domestic regulation, 
transgovernmental initiatives are clearly positively associated with the initiatives’ mitigation 
orientation. The coefficient is significant and positive for all three aggregated indicators ‘sum of 
criteria’, ‘2 criteria met’ and ‘3 criteria met’. However, if there is a domestic target, the effect is 
reversed. It seems that, in line with hypothesis 4, transgovernmental actors compensate (at least 
partly) for a lack of regulation by generating their own, mitigation-oriented TCG initiatives. When 
there is a national target they do not seem to see the requirement for their own engagement any 
more. We expected the stronger design in cases of missing domestic regulation, but we did expect 
that some (albeit weak) positive correlation would remain even when national regulation is 
functioning (hypothesis 3). This cannot be observed in our data. Interestingly, with respect to the 
incentives-related sub-indicator (regression (5)) the relationship is reverse. Apparently, sub-
national entities engage in incentive-based initiatives in a way that complements domestic 
regulation. Maybe in this specific context, the intention is to financially support private companies 
in the sub-national constituencies in meeting the requirements of national regulation. 
Again in line with our theoretical argument (hypotheses 5 and 6), initiatives including NGOs 
tend to show similar characteristics as transgovernmental initiatives. While the association is less 
clearly significant, there is evidence for a positive effect of NGO participation when there is no 
country target [the overall effect is significant for ‘3 criteria met’ (see regression (3) and primarily 
works through a higher share of incentive-based mechanisms (see regression (5))], and a reversal 
of this effect indicated by negative coefficients of similar size when such a country target is present. 
In sum, we observe that, as opposed to entrepreneurial initiatives where stand-alone 
initiatives are negatively associated with mitigation-oriented design, stand-alone initiatives of sub-
national entities and NGOs show a stronger mitigation-oriented design than complementary 
initiatives. This is in line with our theoretical predictions. Results are confirmed by the analysis 
presented in the online appendix. 
Table 3 presents a similar analysis with respect to international regulation. Our indicators 
for functional international regulation (‘Kyoto operational’) and the lack thereof (‘Post 
Copenhagen’) are therefore interacted with the three actor-related variables. A positive interaction 
term with ‘Kyoto operational’ and a negative interaction term with ‘Post Copenhagen’ indicate that 
the actors tended to initiate TCG initiatives with a relatively clear mitigation-oriented design as a 
complement to functioning international rules, while the reversed signs indicate a stronger 
mitigation-oriented design for stand-alone initiatives.  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Examining entrepreneurial initiatives first, we find indications of complementarity with 
significant coefficients in regressions (1) for ‘sum of criteria’, (4) for mitigation targets, and (7) for 
MRV (where, however, only the negative coefficient for the interaction term with ‘Post 
Copenhagen’ is significant). This provides some confirmation for our theoretical argument that 
private companies come up with effectively designed initiatives when rules and regulation lead 
them to expect that some costly action is unavoidable. While we did not find this effect with respect 
to domestic regulation, the effect with respect to international regulation appears quite clear. This 
provides support for hypothesis 2, at least regarding the international level. 
In contrast, just as in the context of national regulation, transgovernmental initiatives with 
a mitigation-oriented design rather tend to emerge when regulation is perceived to be lacking at 
the international level. While transgovernmental TCG initiatives did not stand out for particular 
effectiveness during the high time of the Kyoto Protocol, we find some positively significant 
coefficient estimates for these initiatives during the post-Copenhagen period (see regression (1) for 
‘sum of criteria’ and regression (4) for the definition of mitigation targets). These results indicate 
more stand-alone initiatives with mitigation-oriented designs when the UNFCCC process seemed 
to stall. The substantial effect on ‘sum of criteria’ is strong indicating that on average, after the 
Copenhagen summit, newly initiated transgovernmental TCG initiatives met over one criterion 
more than in earlier periods (the reference period is the period before 2005). These results are 
again in line with our theoretical arguments, namely hypothesis 4. Only for initiatives with strong 
NGO membership, we do not find any significant effects, so that hypothesis 6 cannot be confirmed 
at the international level. As before results are generally confirmed by the regressions with further 
control variables in the online appendix, although results for entrepreneurial initiatives are 
somewhat less significant, while results for transnational ones are even more significant than 
presented here. 
We finally come back to the role of national governments’ or international organizations’ 
orchestration. As already mentioned earlier, the role of governments in getting the initiatives 
started has a robust positive effect on designs oriented towards effective mitigation. Beyond this, 
we do not find any specific effects for international organizations  initiating TCG initiatives(results 
not shown). However, when we look at the second component of orchestration, namely shaping or 
influencing the development of an initiative beyond its creation, we find a number of interesting 
correlations (see Table 4). In particular, the interaction term with the ‘Post Copenhagen’ dummy is 
generally large, positive, and highly significant. This is consistent with an attempt of national 
governments and/or international organizations to compensate for the insufficiency of 
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international regulation by supporting stand-alone TCG initiatives, and thereby confirms 
hypothesis 8. Only with respect to the incentive criterion, the effect is quite different (see 
regression (5)). It appears that in this context, shaping was relatively most successful in the period 
before Kyoto became operational, while other, non-shaped initiatives focused more on incentives 
thereafter.3  
Given that the World Bank is a major player in the orchestration of TCG initiatives, one 
might imagine that the strong effect of shaping for the mitigation-orientation of stand-alone 
initiatives is driven by the Bank’s interventions. To test this, we also interact the period dummies 
with the dummy for the World Bank as the founding agent. It becomes clear that the increasing 
focus on a mitigation-oriented design in the post-Copenhagen period is not due to World Bank 
engagement. At the exception of the mitigation target the association between World Bank 
founded initiatives and the design criteria met was highest in the period before Kyoto became 
operational, and lower both during the high time of the Kyoto Protocol and after the Copenhagen 
conference. All results are again confirmed by the corresponding, more complete regression table 
in the online appendix. 
Table 4 about here 
 
In sum, our empirical results are largely in line with theoretical expectations. There is no 
evidence for any kind of stand-alone moves by private firms towards TCG initiatives with a 
mitigation-oriented design, but some evidence for related activities in response to international 
regulation (in line with hypotheses 1 and 2). In contrast, some attempts to establish mitigation-
oriented stand-alone initiatives when national and international regulation is missing (or 
insufficient) can be observed by sub-national governments (transgovernmental initiatives) and 
NGOs (the latter only at national level). This is in line with hypotheses 4 and 6, while the generally 
positive (albeit weak) effect of these membership groups on the design of TCG initiatives cannot be 
observed (no support for hypotheses 3 and 5). Moreover, hypothesis 7 on orchestration is 
confirmed with respect to the initiating role of governments, and hypothesis 8 on orchestration for 
stand-alone initiatives is confirmed with respect to shaping.  
                                                            
3 Given our focus on institutional design, it may be surprising to see that – at least regarding the influence of 
international organizations – shaping has a stronger role here than initiating although it refers to a later period in the 
life of the institution. We assume that this is related to some influence the relevant organizations may have had right 
from the beginning even though they did not join the initiative as a founding member. 
 
What does this imply in terms of the questions posed above? Can we expect TCG initiatives 
to support governments’ efforts to reach their NDCs or even to go beyond that and hence 
contribute to closing the gap remaining between the sum of NDCs and the emission reductions 
necessary to remain below the 2° target as agreed in Paris? Since convincing entrepreneurial 
initiatives are primarily reactive to existing international regulation, it can be expected that they 
will also respond to the Paris Agreement and help implementing related domestic policies in an 
efficient way. Transgovernmental initiatives and initiatives with NGO members may wish to go 
beyond that by building up mitigation-oriented stand-alone initiatives if they feel that the existing 
national and international regulation is not far-reaching enough. This could help to fill the 
remaining emissions gap. However, given the generally very weak design of TCG initiatives when it 
comes to the basic criteria mitigation target, incentives, baseline and MRV, our results do not 
suggest that their contribution will be substantial. 
 
Conclusions 
While the Paris Agreement is a breakthrough in the multilateral climate negotiation process 
under the UNFCCC, its target of keeping global warming well below 2°C is not consistent with the 
sum of the national emission reduction pledges. Thus transnational climate governance initiatives 
are seen by many observers as opportunities to close this gap, and to be an “add-on” to the 
insufficient mitigation effort of national governments. Is this really the case or is the role of such 
initiatives rather a complementary one so that we can expect them to contribute to emission 
reduction only in combination with existing regulation at the international and domestic level? 
Under which conditions can these initiatives be expected to achieve any mitigation at all?  
We assess 109 transnational initiatives through a simple design indicator that is determined 
by the existence of a mitigation target, the provision of incentives for mitigation, the specification 
of a baseline from which mitigation is determined, and the existence of provisions for MRV of 
mitigation. About half of the initiatives do not fulfil any of these basic criteria, while about 13% 
meet three of them. Only one initiative satisfies all four criteria. As the different criteria are 
complementary, meeting several of them simultaneously is necessary for a convincing design. The 
main purpose of most initiatives is simply some networking. This is a rather sobering result to start 
with and does not suggest that these initiatives will provide any significant contribution to closing 
the emissions gap. This is true unless – as suggested by a more social-constructionist literature – 
they develop some internal dynamics that drive them to become effective despite their initial 
design and the initial intentions of their members. We do not believe that this is very plausible in 
our context.  
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While some stand-alone mitigation-oriented initiatives can be found among 
transgovernmental initiatives and initiatives with NGO participation, entrepreneurial initiatives 
tend to show a convincing design only in response to international regulation. Indeed the few cases 
of effective entrepreneurial activities (meeting more than two of the above criteria) can be seen as 
complementary to regulation under the Kyoto Protocol.  
Some other variables are statistically linked to our indicators of mitigation-related design. 
Initiatives orchestrated by governments or international institutions focus more on incentives but 
are lacking mitigation targets. Generally, government support in setting up an initiative is positively 
linked to a mitigation-oriented design. As far as stand-alone initiatives are concerned, we find no 
specifically positive effect of initiation, but of shaping by international organization and national 
governments.  
In sum, the ambition of transnational climate governance initiatives is way too low to close 
the emissions gap under the Paris Agreement. This holds for all types of initiatives, no matter 
whether the key actors are private firms, sub-national governments or NGOs. In addition, the 
initiatives’ mitigation ambition often directly depends on the willingness to mitigate resulting from 
the international climate negotiation process (notably for entrepreneurial initiatives). While 
potentially useful to improve the efficiency of the implementation of existing national policies, 
these initiatives cannot be expected to make up for lack of country-level mitigation ambition in the 
UNFCCC process. 
What are the implications of these findings for policy makers?  
First, national governments cannot rely on other actors to do their job. As long as they 
hesitate to set sufficiently ambitious emission targets at the domestic level and to define 
appropriate policy instruments for implementation, there are little chances that the global climate 
change limitation target affirmed in the Paris Agreement will be met.  
Second, governments have ample choice between different policy instruments. They need 
to provide the incentives for others to act. Whether they do so by increasing the cost for the 
production or consumption of emission-intensive goods and services (for example through taxes), 
or whether they provide funding to reward emission reductions (thereby increasing the opportunity 
cost for those actors who continue to generate high emissions), both can be designed in a way to 
internalize the negative externalities related to global warming. In the former case, governments 
can use their traditional policy instruments while in the latter one, they can make use of approaches 
that have been applied within the framework of TCG initiatives. The Pilot Auction Facility for 
instance, provides rewards for emission reduction projects, while the diverse carbon funds allow 
 
governments (and other actors) to directly buy emission reduction credits. These are alternative 
ways to provide the same kind of incentives, but what matters is the determination and clarity of 
the approach. We have seen that government initiation and shaping can influence the design of 
TCG initiatives. But in order to reach a substantial impact, the magnitude of the financial incentives 
must be proportionate to the severity of the problem to solve.  
There will be substantial costs of mitigation commensurate with the Paris Agreement 
target, and the choice between alternative policy instruments will have an impact on the 
distribution of wealth within the society. This is another aspect that policy makers will have to 
consider, but its discussion goes beyond the scope of this paper. Once the incentives for mitigation 
are set, government support for further activities like networking and information exchange can 
help private and non-private actors to achieve mitigation cost-efficiently.  
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Figure 1: Share of initiatives meeting 0 to 4 basic design criteria for effective mitigation 
 
Figure 2: The development of new initiatives, overall and by number of criteria met 
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Table 1: TCG initiatives by purpose  
Main purpose of TCG initiatives Number Share 
A. Mitigation   
 Networking 63 57.8% 
 Standards 21 19.3% 
 Carbon funds 9 8.3% 
 Technology development 4 3.7% 
 Other 7 6.4% 
B. Adaptation 5 4.6% 
Total  109 100% 
 
Table 2: Correlates of mitigation-related design – examining complementarity with national regulation  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Sum of 
criteria 
2 criteria met 3 criteria met Mitigation target Incentives Baseline MRV 
Depends on gov. 1.49*** 0.58*** 0.77*** 0.00 0.62*** 0.54*** 0.32** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.98) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) 
Country target 1.14* 0.35* 0.45* 0.18 0.29* 0.35 0.32 
 (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.14) (0.07) (0.11) (0.44) 
Entrepreneurial -0.14** -0.10*** 0.05 0.03* -0.05 -0.09** -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.00) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.02) (0.48) 
Target x Entrepr. 0.37 0.20 -0.12 0.11 0.04 0.16 0.05 
 (0.24) (0.15) (0.27) (0.36) (0.37) (0.23) (0.58) 
Transgovernmental 0.39*** 0.08* 0.19*** 0.18*** -0.09** 0.09** 0.20*** 
 (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) 
Target x Transg. -0.65* -0.15 -0.24*** -0.21* 0.21** -0.16 -0.49*** 
 (0.07) (0.19) (0.00) (0.08) (0.05) (0.15) (0.01) 
NGO members 0.32 0.06 0.21* 0.06 0.18*** 0.09 -0.01 
 (0.15) (0.34) (0.10) (0.13) (0.00) (0.41) (0.91) 
Target x NGOs -0.42 -0.04 -0.19 -0.11* -0.16** -0.10 -0.05 
 (0.18) (0.57) (0.17) (0.07) (0.01) (0.36) (0.85) 
Structure -0.36*** -0.16** -0.01 0.04 -0.04 -0.17** -0.20*** 
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.80) (0.11) (0.46) (0.04) (0.00) 
Adaptation focus -0.82 -0.26 -0.21 -0.06 -0.14 -0.24 -0.38* 
 (0.12) (0.20) (0.14) (0.17) (0.44) (0.20) (0.07) 
EU 1.21*** 0.36*** 0.42*** 0.89*** -0.16 0.35*** 0.14 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.00) (0.39) 
WB 0.50 0.18 0.13 0.07 0.29 0.08 0.05 
 (0.45) (0.40) (0.61) (0.47) (0.11) (0.72) (0.89) 
INT 0.61 0.24 0.24 0.00 0.32** 0.20 0.09 
 (0.30) (0.18) (0.27) (0.98) (0.04) (0.23) (0.82) 
Year -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02** 
 (0.18) (0.82) (0.82) (0.92) (0.13) (0.99) (0.03) 
Constant 47.38 3.97 2.92 1.35 13.98 0.58 31.47** 
 (0.17) (0.81) (0.84) (0.93) (0.13) (0.97) (0.03) 
Adj. R2 0.46 0.39 0.45 0.15 0.50 0.36 0.34 
N 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 
Notes: Linear regression models with p-values in parentheses based on robust standard errors (heteroscedasticity consistent and clustered by 
founding country);  
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level respectively. Variable names are abbreviated in interaction terms: Country 
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Online Appendix I: Variable description 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics, sources and explanations 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Variable description Sources 
Sum of criteria 109 0.96 1.10 0 4 Total number of individual design criteria met Authors  
2 criteria met 109 0.28 0.45 0 1 Dummy=1 if at least 2 criteria met, otherwise=0 Authors  
3 criteria met 109 0.15 0.36 0 1 Dummy=1 if at least 3 criteria met, otherwise=0 Authors  
Mitigation target 109 0.11 0.31 0 1 Dummy=1 if initiative has defined a mitigation target, otherwise=0 Authors  
Incentives 109 0.13 0.34 0 1 Dummy=1 if initiative provides a financial incentive for mitigation, otherwise=0 Authors  
Baseline 109 0.27 0.44 0 1 Dummy=1 if initiative has specified a baseline for mitigation, otherwise= 0 Authors  
MRV 109 0.46 0.50 0 1 Dummy=1 if initiative includes a MRV system, otherwise=0 Authors  
Depends on gov. 109 0.15 0.36 0 1 Dummy =1 if start of initiative depended on national government action usually as a 
founding member, but also if initiative specifically refers to national government policies 
(whether in favor of climate policy or not), otherwise=0 
Authors  
Country target 60 0.95 0.22 0 1 Mitigation target of the founding country: no or “inadequate” target=0, otherwise=1, 
whereby “inadequate” is defined as: “if all governments put forward inadequate 
positions warming likely to exceed 3–4°C”; missing for WB and INT 
Ecofys et al. (2014) 
Structure 109 2.33 0.93 1 3 Centralized=1, coordinated=2, decentralized=3 (networks) Authors  
Adaptation focus 109 0.05 0.21 0 1 Dummy=1 if initiative focuses primarily on adaptation, otherwise=0 Authors  
Entrepreneurial 109 0.33 0.47 0 1 Dummy=1 if non-state actors played the leading role in creating the initiative (in practice, 
non-state actors in this context are primarily firms and business association, but in some 
cases also NGOs), otherwise=0  
Roger et al. (2015), updated by the 
authors 
Transgovernmental 109 0.15 0.36 0 1 Dummy=1 if only sub-state actors (cities or sub-national governments) were responsible 
for the creation of the initiative, otherwise=0 
Roger et al. (2015), updated by the 
authors 
NGO members 109 0.53 0.50 0 1 Dummy=1 if the initiative has NGO members, otherwise=0 Authors  
Shaping 109 0.05 0.21 0 1 Dummy=1 if there was an active role of national government(s) or international 
organization in shaping the initiative, e.g., by influencing the initiative’s rules and 
activities and/or by providing resources after the start of the initiative, otherwise=0. 
Roger et al. (2015), updated by the 
authors 
Kyoto operational 109 0.40 0.49 0 1 Dummy=1 if 2005<=year>=2009, otherwise=0 
 
Post Copenhagen 109 0.31 0.47 0 1 Dummy=1 if year>2009, otherwise=0 
 
GCF 58 21.56 4.26 14.97 47.58 Gross capital formation (% of GDP) in founding country; missing for EU, WB and INT World Bank (2015) 
Energy efficiency 58 8.58 2.91 4.01 17.32 GDP per unit of energy use (constant 2011 PPP $ per kg of oil equivalent) in founding 
country; missing for EU, WB and INT 
World Bank (2015) 
Emissions pc 58 15.14 6.78 1.63 29.79 Total greenhouse gas emissions including forestry (tCO2eq per capita) in founding 
country; missing for EU, WB and INT 
World Resources Institute (2015) 
Election year 58 0.41 0.50 0 1 Dummy=1 if start year coincides with major legislative or presidential election in the 
founding country, otherwise=0; missing for EU, WB and INT 
Beck et al. (2001), updated by World 
Bank (2013) and by the authors 
No of initiatives 109 8.82 5.63 1 18 Total number of initiatives started per year Roger et al. (2015), updated by the 
authors 
EU 109 0.02 0.13 0 1 Dummy=1 if initiative founded by the EU, otherwise=0 Authors 
WB 109 0.12 0.33 0 1 Dummy=1 if initiative founded by the World Bank, otherwise=0 Authors 
INT 109 0.33 0.47 0 1 Dummy=1 if initiative founded by actors from different countries (international, no lead 
country) , otherwise=0 
Authors 
year 109 2007 5.88 1990 2015 Starting year of the initiative Roger et al. (2015), updated and 
adjusted by the authors 
Notes: "Founding country" refers to the country in which the initiative was founded or in which the founding actor is located. However, the location of international organizations is not considered in this context (e.g., the 
United States does not count as a founding country for initiatives launched by the World Bank). The qualitative variable “founding country” contains separate categories for the World Bank, the EU and other international 
organizations (INT). Variables referring to founding countries have no observations for WB, EU and INT (at the exception of the country target that is defined for the EU). Otherwise, data are complete as missing values were 
imputed by linear inter- or extrapolation. In all multivariate estimations, missing values of country-related variables for WB, EU and INT were replaced by 0 to avoid considerable loss of observations. This is why all estimations 
also include dummy variables for these three international actors. Country characteristics always refer to the founding country and the starting year of the initiative.  
When "Authors" is indicated as the data source, the data has been collected through a web search on the websites of the individual initiatives listed in the Roger et al. (2015) TCG dataset and additional initiatives added by the 
authors following the criteria in Roger et al. (2015). 
 
 
Online Appendix II: Methodological considerations 
As all dependent variables are categorical, a discussion of the appropriate statistical model seems of order. 
‘Sum of criteria’ is a count variable with values between zero and four, and ‘2 criteria met’, ‘3 criteria met’ as well 
as the individual variables for each of the criteria are binary indicators. One could hence consider a Poisson or 
negative binomial model for ‘sum of criteria’ and logit or probit models for the other dependent variables. In terms 
of the goodness of fit statistics, Poisson seems to work fine (no indication of overdispersion). This led us to carry 
out a set of initial regressions using Poisson and Probit models. However, the Poisson model is conceptually 
problematic here because it implicitly assumes that the count of positive events (here the number of criteria met) 
could go towards infinity. A more appropriate alternative could hence be an ordered probit model. Based on our 
data, its results are similar in terms of the sign and significance of the coefficients. 
However, there are a number of problems with these specifications. First, the results of non-linear models 
are difficult to interpret in a setting with (multiple) interaction terms. As shown by Ai and Norton (2003) for probit 
and logit models, not even the size and significance of interaction terms can be directly interpreted. It is obviously 
possible to separately compute the difference in predicted probability for any combinations of initial conditions, 
and hence the marginal effects. However, given that not only the dependent variables, but also the explanatory 
variables are mostly categorical, not all the combinations of initial conditions actually exist in the data. Moreover, 
depending on the dependent variable, some variable combinations perfectly determine the outcome so that they 
are dropped from the model along with the corresponding observations. While this is fine for the interpretation 
of the individual model, it leads to different specifications and different samples depending on the dependent 
variable thereby impeding comparisons across models. Finally, the structure of the data suggests that there might 
be multiple correlations between the error terms due, for instance, to the participation of the same actors in 
different initiatives. Binary response models are inconsistent in this case, and “robust” estimation cannot mitigate 
the problem (Greene 2002, p. 673f.).  
To avoid these problems and to facilitate the presentation of results, we hence proceed with simple linear 
models in the following. The use of linear probability models has by now become very common as the only major 
problem, namely the occurrence of heteroscedasticity, can be easily healed through the use of robust estimators. 
Regarding the ‘sum of criteria’ an additional concern could be that the steps from one category to the next 
(meaning from meeting one criterion, to two, to three, to four) might not be equally ‘distant’ as a linear model 
would assume. However, these distances can be checked from the cut-offs of individual categories in the ordered 
probit, and the result gives us some confidence to proceed with the linear model. In all models, we use 
heteroscedasticity consistent error terms that are also clustered by founding country (or organization), i.e., based 
on the place where the initiative was founded or where the founding actor was located. We further carry out some 
robustness checks first by omitting the five adaptation initiatives, and second by merging the observations with 3 
and 4 criteria met to a single category for the dependent variable ‘sum of criteria’. Changes are minimal, so that 
we only report the outcomes of our main regressions here.  
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Online Appendix III: Complementary regression results 
Table A2: Correlates of mitigation-related design – examining complementarity with national regulation  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Sum of criteria 2 criteria met 3 criteria met Mitigation target Incentives Baseline MRV 
Depends on gov. 1.66*** 0.59*** 0.79*** -0.05 0.65*** 0.58*** 0.47*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.76) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Country Target 1.25** 0.38** 0.43** 0.24* 0.29** 0.37** 0.36 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.28) 
Entrepreneurial -0.10 -0.06** 0.07* 0.03 -0.05 -0.06* -0.00 
 (0.32) (0.02) (0.07) (0.30) (0.22) (0.08) (0.96) 
Target x Entrepr. 0.40 0.22* -0.13 0.08 0.04 0.19 0.10 
 (0.22) (0.09) (0.28) (0.51) (0.66) (0.17) (0.23) 
Transgovernmental 0.45*** 0.10** 0.20*** 0.19*** -0.09** 0.11*** 0.23*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
Target x Transg. -0.79** -0.16* -0.25*** -0.28** 0.19* -0.17* -0.53** 
 (0.02) (0.08) (0.00) (0.02) (0.05) (0.09) (0.02) 
NGO members 0.28 0.04 0.19 0.07* 0.18*** 0.07 -0.04 
 (0.24) (0.55) (0.15) (0.08) (0.00) (0.56) (0.71) 
Target x NGOs -0.33 -0.02 -0.15 -0.11* -0.14* -0.08 -0.01 
 (0.38) (0.84) (0.33) (0.06) (0.06) (0.58) (0.98) 
GCF -0.01 0.00 -0.01** -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
 (0.57) (0.26) (0.04) (0.32) (0.25) (0.51) (0.98) 
Energy efficiency -0.17*** -0.07*** -0.04** -0.01 -0.01 -0.06*** -0.08*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.51) (0.52) (0.00) (0.00) 
Emissions pc -0.06** -0.02** -0.01** 0.01 -0.01 -0.02** -0.04*** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.52) (0.31) (0.02) (0.01) 
Election year -0.15 -0.05 0.07 -0.15 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.68) (0.70) (0.54) (0.32) (0.82) (0.89) (0.88) 
No of initiatives 0.01 0.01 0.01** -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.00 
 (0.60) (0.17) (0.03) (0.62) (0.98) (0.21) (0.64) 
Structure -0.32*** -0.14** -0.01 0.05 -0.04 -0.16** -0.18*** 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.73) (0.13) (0.47) (0.04) (0.00) 
Adaptation focus -0.81 -0.27 -0.28 -0.03 -0.15 -0.25 -0.37 
 (0.22) (0.24) (0.11) (0.61) (0.48) (0.20) (0.14) 
EU -1.19 -0.41 -0.31 0.75*** -0.45* -0.44 -1.04* 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.24) (0.01) (0.09) (0.13) (0.05) 
WB -2.03** -0.54* -0.62** -0.05 -0.05 -0.69** -1.24 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.90) (0.87) (0.04) (0.10) 
INT -1.85* -0.52* -0.51* -0.16 0.01 -0.58** -1.12 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.63) (0.98) (0.04) (0.12) 
Year -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.50) (0.78) (0.65) (0.84) (0.17) (0.95) (0.22) 
Constant 35.13 7.14 8.04 -4.53 12.41 2.22 25.02 
 (0.46) (0.75) (0.64) (0.84) (0.16) (0.92) (0.18) 
Adj. R2 0.48 0.41 0.46 0.16 0.48 0.37 0.36 
N 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 
Note: Linear regression models with p-values in parentheses based on robust standard errors (heteroscedasticity consistent and clustered by founding country);  
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level respectively. Variable names are abbreviated in interaction terms: Country target  Target, 
Entrepreneurial  Entrepr., Transgovernmental  Transg., NGO members  NGOs.  
 
 
Table A3: Correlates of mitigation-related design – examining complementarity with international regulation  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Sum of criteria 2 criteria met 3 criteria met Mitigation target Incentives Baseline MRV 
Depends on gov. 1.59*** 0.56*** 0.71*** -0.02 0.60*** 0.52*** 0.49*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.85) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Country Target 1.18*** 0.41** 0.35** 0.20 0.24* 0.39*** 0.35 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.25) (0.06) (0.01) (0.22) 
Kyoto operational -0.26 0.00 -0.20 -0.14 -0.05 -0.18 0.11 
 (0.65) (0.99) (0.27) (0.45) (0.74) (0.66) (0.66) 
Post Copenhagen 0.21 0.13 -0.01 -0.07 0.00 0.02 0.26 
 (0.75) (0.71) (0.96) (0.77) (0.99) (0.96) (0.54) 
Entrepreneurial 0.09 0.08 -0.12 0.08 -0.11 -0.06 0.18 
 (0.77) (0.66) (0.30) (0.50) (0.31) (0.81) (0.23) 
Kyoto x Entrepr. 0.76 0.22 0.14 0.18* 0.08 0.36 0.14 
 (0.12) (0.27) (0.37) (0.07) (0.64) (0.17) (0.71) 
Copenh. x Entrepr. -0.41 -0.10 0.10 -0.21 0.11 0.04 -0.35 
 (0.11) (0.58) (0.35) (0.17) (0.18) (0.86) (0.10) 
Transgovernmental -0.92 -0.21 -0.32 -0.15 -0.03 -0.29 -0.45 
 (0.13) (0.45) (0.27) (0.48) (0.83) (0.33) (0.17) 
Kyoto x Transg. 1.24 0.34 0.59 0.12 0.20 0.50 0.42 
 (0.16) (0.34) (0.13) (0.57) (0.36) (0.25) (0.31) 
Copenh. x Transg. 1.43** 0.31 0.45* 0.44* 0.01 0.37 0.62* 
 (0.02) (0.24) (0.07) (0.07) (0.97) (0.16) (0.06) 
NGO members 0.23 0.17 0.04 -0.02 0.17 0.06 0.02 
 (0.64) (0.38) (0.85) (0.91) (0.19) (0.80) (0.90) 
Kyoto x NGOs -0.17 -0.20 0.10 0.07 -0.02 -0.05 -0.17 
 (0.72) (0.46) (0.62) (0.76) (0.83) (0.88) (0.21) 
Copenh. x NGOs -0.36 -0.20 -0.01 -0.05 -0.17 -0.11 -0.03 
 (0.50) (0.40) (0.96) (0.73) (0.22) (0.69) (0.91) 
GCF 0.02 0.01* -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.02 
 (0.26) (0.06) (0.35) (0.82) (0.26) (0.13) (0.33) 
Energy efficiency -0.13*** -0.06*** -0.03*** -0.00 -0.01 -0.05*** -0.06** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.92) (0.23) (0.00) (0.03) 
Emissions pc -0.05** -0.02** -0.01** 0.01 -0.01 -0.02* -0.03** 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.49) (0.14) (0.08) (0.02) 
Election year -0.13 -0.04 0.11 -0.17 0.01 0.00 0.03 
 (0.73) (0.77) (0.40) (0.34) (0.94) (1.00) (0.69) 
No of initiatives 0.02 0.01** 0.01** -0.00 0.00 0.01* 0.01* 
 (0.18) (0.04) (0.02) (0.92) (0.99) (0.06) (0.09) 
Structure -0.23 -0.11 -0.03 0.08** -0.02 -0.13 -0.16** 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.70) (0.03) (0.74) (0.18) (0.03) 
Adaptation focus -0.65 -0.22 -0.24* 0.02 -0.15 -0.21 -0.31 
 (0.23) (0.29) (0.08) (0.62) (0.46) (0.16) (0.16) 
EU -0.19 -0.14 -0.11 1.04*** -0.53* -0.14 -0.56 
 (0.80) (0.56) (0.55) (0.00) (0.09) (0.63) (0.40) 
WB -0.74 -0.15 -0.34 0.25 -0.18 -0.24 -0.57 
 (0.38) (0.65) (0.17) (0.59) (0.64) (0.56) (0.49) 
INT -0.59 -0.17 -0.22 0.17 -0.18 -0.17 -0.42 
 (0.49) (0.57) (0.36) (0.69) (0.62) (0.64) (0.60) 
Year -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.04 
 (0.21) (0.45) (0.41) (0.96) (0.86) (0.62) (0.16) 
Constant 102.71 26.97 26.35 2.03 2.51 19.63 78.53 
 (0.20) (0.44) (0.40) (0.96) (0.84) (0.60) (0.15) 
Adj. R2 0.49 0.40 0.46 0.17 0.45 0.37 0.35 
N 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 
Note: Linear regression models with p-values in parentheses based on robust standard errors (heteroscedasticity consistent and clustered by founding country);  
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level respectively. Variable names are abbreviated in interaction terms: Kyoto operational  Kyoto, Post 




Table A4: Correlates of mitigation-related design – examining ‘shaping’ in conjunction with international regulation  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Sum of criteria 2 criteria met 3 criteria met Mitigation target Incentives Baseline MRV 
Depends on gov. 1.19*** 0.40*** 0.75*** -0.12 0.60*** 0.41*** 0.30*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.30) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Country Target 1.07** 0.38*** 0.32** 0.22* 0.22 0.32*** 0.32 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.10) (0.10) (0.00) (0.23) 
Kyoto operational 0.15 0.04 0.01 -0.06 0.02 0.09 0.11 
 (0.75) (0.82) (0.96) (0.34) (0.83) (0.59) (0.73) 
Post Copenhagen 0.16 0.06 0.07 -0.07 -0.03 0.10 0.16 
 (0.79) (0.81) (0.73) (0.68) (0.82) (0.64) (0.74) 
Shaping 0.11 0.03 0.21 -0.20** 0.38*** 0.09 -0.16 
 (0.80) (0.86) (0.32) (0.03) (0.00) (0.53) (0.50) 
Kyoto x Shaping -0.73 -0.08 -0.31 0.16 -0.45*** -0.15 -0.29 
 (0.32) (0.73) (0.27) (0.11) (0.01) (0.52) (0.42) 
Copenh. x Shaping 1.77*** 1.05*** -0.19 0.15* -0.42*** 0.99*** 1.04*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.37) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Kyoto x WB -1.20*** -0.47*** -0.44*** 0.11** -0.06 -0.88*** -0.37* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.21) (0.00) (0.09) 
Copenh. x WB -0.75** -0.41*** -0.07 0.01 -0.01 -0.44*** -0.31 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.58) (0.93) (0.92) (0.00) (0.17) 
GCF -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01* 0.00 0.01 
 (0.97) (0.41) (0.28) (0.43) (0.05) (0.73) (0.28) 
Energy efficiency -0.18*** -0.07*** -0.04*** -0.01 -0.02 -0.07*** -0.08*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.65) (0.13) (0.00) (0.01) 
Emissions pc -0.06** -0.02* -0.01** 0.01 -0.01* -0.02** -0.04*** 
 (0.02) (0.07) (0.01) (0.38) (0.06) (0.02) (0.01) 
Election year -0.12 -0.05 0.11 -0.16 0.04 -0.02 0.01 
 (0.80) (0.73) (0.44) (0.35) (0.76) (0.90) (0.91) 
No of initiatives 0.02 0.02*** 0.01** -0.00 0.00 0.02*** 0.01 
 (0.14) (0.01) (0.04) (0.68) (0.99) (0.01) (0.14) 
Structure -0.42*** -0.18*** -0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.19*** -0.22*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.39) (0.34) (0.63) (0.00) (0.00) 
Adaptation focus -0.82 -0.29 -0.20* -0.08 -0.16 -0.21** -0.37* 
 (0.12) (0.15) (0.08) (0.14) (0.50) (0.04) (0.06) 
EU -1.65** -0.57* -0.31 0.66** -0.49** -0.64** -1.19** 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.17) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
WB -1.18 -0.16 -0.45 -0.03 -0.13 -0.29 -0.73 
 (0.18) (0.56) (0.18) (0.94) (0.46) (0.32) (0.32) 
INT -1.90** -0.58** -0.44 -0.10 -0.17 -0.71*** -0.91 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.11) (0.77) (0.41) (0.01) (0.19) 
Year -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.44) (0.56) (0.62) (0.82) (0.92) (0.54) (0.43) 
Constant 73.57 21.56 17.38 -8.41 1.80 23.71 56.47 
 (0.42) (0.54) (0.61) (0.82) (0.90) (0.52) (0.42) 
Adj. R2 0.50 0.46 0.45 0.11 0.44 0.47 0.38 
N 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 
Note: Linear regression models with p-values in parentheses based on robust standard errors (heteroscedasticity consistent and clustered by founding country);  
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level respectively. Variable names are abbreviated in interaction terms: Kyoto operational  Kyoto, Post 
Copenhagen  Copenh. 
 
 
